5.8. DISCURSIVE ARTICULATION: 2006-2011
5.8. DISCURSIVE ARTICULATION: 2006-2011
5.8.1. Topics
As the size and number of businesses owned by GC participants increased and they became important actors of the economic system in Turkey, the Community itself became more institutionalized, the reach of its institutions increased and the range of its activities diversified. As a result, especially after 2006, there was a discernible increase in the number and range of issues in the community’s publications. In Sızıntı, Kırık Testi and Bamteli, identity construction through descriptions of self and others continued to be one of the most prominent topics. As more and more women in the GC started to work both in the institutions of the community and in the private sector, women’s role in the public and private spheres became an issue of interest. The need to regulate the relationship between men and women increased. As a result, after 2006, there was a significant increase in the number of articles on marriage and family life, working mothers and their families, and divorce. Compared to the early 2000s, in this period concepts of dialog, human rights, justice and democracy were also much more elaborated upon, and articulated into the community discourse. Articles on economic issues increased in number. As community businesses became more successful, a need emerged to regulate the relations between employer and employee. Community discourse evolved in order to shape these relationships. Many diverse issues on the economy were covered in the publications: how to conduct trade; business ethics; globalization and economic crisis; worker’s rights; and relations between employers and employees in Islam. From time to time these topics have been accompanied by a criticism of a consumption society. In line with neo-liberal discourse, social services and altruism were offered as a remedy for the economic hardships. Explanations of social justice and the principles of an Islamic economic system were provided as a guide for Muslim businessmen.
5.8.2. Nomination
As a result of the diversification of community members’ activities, new categories for construction of the self and other emerged. The other became more defined. Alongside the “West,” publications started to identify the EU and USA as separate actors. Even more specific, US corporations and European youth emerged as actors in community publications. As community members started to interact with an increasing number of actors in various settings, different constructions of self emerged with reference to different others. In the US community, members saw themselves as “representatives of the Turkish nation.”476
Table 5.2. Nomination of Self and Other in the GC Discourse between 2006 and 20
5.8.3. Predication
a. Self and Other
In the latter half of the 2000s, the financial resources of the GC grew significantly, increasing the range and reach of the Community activities. As a result, the Community members started to interact with many different actors, including other Islamic business associations such as MÜSĐAD, as well as with non-Islamic TÜSĐAD, international governmental and non-governmental institutions. In the process, the discourses of the Community regarding relationships between actors in the economic sphere, in families, and in everyday life became more elaborate. As the Community started to interact with more diverse actors, it felt to need to communicate with them, while preserving its own identity. As a result, “dialog and tolerance between cultures,” and “inter-faith dialogue” discourses dominated the Community’s interaction with non-Turkish social actors.
Another significant change in the community discourse has been the construction of a division between the folk Muslimness or “cultural Muslimness” and “conscious Muslimness.” This division served to differentiate community members, who are “conscious Muslims,” from people who practice Islam in accordance with what they have learnt from their environment. The latter group of people learns Islam from cultural practices, while conscious Muslimness is acquired from authorities on Islam such as Said-i Nursi. “Cultural” Muslimness was identified as one of the major threats, and a disaster for the believers.477 Those who view cultural Muslimness as sufficient, see Islam as similar to other cultural traditions. It is imitated. A person cannot meet with/discover true Islam in this way. This discourse involved the assumption that there is only one true Islam, and it should be learnt from a theologian or religious authority. The distinction between cultural and conscious Muslimness has given the community the power of knowledge, which means that the community is constructing itself as an authority on what “conscious Muslim” identity entails.
b. Working Women
Neoliberalization of the economic system and feminization of the workforce alongside it increased women’s presence in the public sphere. Jobs in the informal economy with no job security, low wages, flexible working hours, part time or done from home are disproportionately filled by women.478 In response to changing socioeconomic structure, Sızıntı published articles on changes in gender roles and in relations in both the public and private spheres. These articles mostly focused on working mothers, marriage and family life. Followers of the community asked Gülen many questions abou these changes, and his responses were published in Kırık Testi and Bamteli. In an article on working mothers, he advises women to consider all the adverse effects of working on their children.479 The article does not mention any positive effects. Omission of the other side of the story serves to legitimate staying at home. He argues that women are by nature (italics mine) more sensitive to fatigue and stress. In addition, if the wages are barely enough to cover the costs of commuting, food (consumed at work) and child care expenses, staying home is argued to be more beneficial. Elsewhere Gülen frames daycare for children in terms of their being alone, deprived of parents’ care, and more or less abandoned.480 So, the advice in the journal is that “working only if necessary” should be the principle in deciding to work.
In Bamteli, Gülen mentioned that women can work as long as the workplace is run in accordance with the basic principles of religion. Women and men decide on this together and arrange their daily chores.481 In an article in Sızıntı published three years later, details regarding working women were elaborated. Accordingly, there are certain jobs that can be performed by women. If the mother works in such a job, other family members need to help (italics mine) her with the household chores. Aydınlı argued that in Islam women and men have clearly assigned roles.482 The head of the household is the father. If the mother earns more than the father and is economically independent, she should be respectful to her spouse as the head of the household. Children should see their father as the authority at home. Working should not be understood as gaining power or selfsufficiency. Working means providing the required support for the family. If mothers use working as an advantage this will weaken the bonds in the family.
In the context of GC, women’s “nature” (fıtrat) was used as a reference point or “prism” through which the concept of “working woman” was articulated into the community discourse. A woman who acts according to her fıtrat does not work unless it is a necessity for the family’s well-being. If she works, she works in a job that is appropriate to her fıtrat. She respects gender relations in the household that are determined by fıtrat. The concept of fıtrat provides an adjustment to and acceptance of the gender inequalities exacerbated by the neo-liberal economy. A discourse which adopts the concept of “citizen’s rights” as a reference point/prism in understanding social services would characterize higher wages and childcare services for women as a “right” of the citizen. A discourse that ignores or de-emphasizes the idea that provision welfare services is the right of the citizens and an obligation of the state prevents the criticism of a political system that overrides these rights or views welfare services as a “gift” from the stare to its citizens. Such a discourse also accepts and legitimates the circumstances neoliberalization pushes women into. Readers can infer that it is normal for women to receive lower wages because women are constructed as physically weak and mentally “more sensitive to stress” at work. Taking care of children is the mother’s job; therefore, it is normal that childcare is not provided. By informing women that their children need their mothers in various times of the day, part-time jobs and working from home are encouraged, but again only if such work is absolutely necessary for the family. This discourse not only serves to perpetuate the neoliberal system. It also supports the AKP’s discourse which constructs the institution of family as the main protector of women from injustices, as opposed to “rights” ensured by the state as discussed in Chapter 3.
c. The Economy
c.1. Lack of morality as the cause of economic problems and an “Islamic Economy” as a remedy
Criticism of capitalism in the late 1990s and early 2000s evolved into criticism of more specific aspects of the world economic system by the latter half of the 2000s. The criticism by Gülen was now directed towards the self-interested homo-economicus, the consumption society, the concentration of power in the world economic system and the resulting inequalities between countries. Globalization was constructed as a threatening process.483 The problems caused by economic policies in Turkey were not discussed; rather, economic inequalities were portrayed as resulting from a materialist culture based on self-interest, and inequality between the countries’ economic powers. Turkey’s economic interests were presented as unitary.
The main reason for economic crises and inequalities was viewed as the degeneration of morality. Here, morality is understood as a timeless and universal measure of human behavior. Degeneration of morality results from a loss of cultural values. It is significant that since the mid-1990s, the economic system itself had never been viewed as a cause of the spread of values such as self-interest. When morality degenerates, unsatisfied ambition, self-interest and the blinding effect of one’s bodily appetites takes over individuals. The financial crises seem to be a result of combined decisions of selfinterested individuals who lack moral values.484 In the June 2011 issue of Sızıntı, Yavas argued that “consumption madness”, indulgence in luxury and extravagance lead to economic crises.485
To avoid economic problems such as financial crises and inequality, we need to restore morality. An Islamic economy would ensure moral practices and lead to economic prosperity. An “Islamic economy” refers to the economic system adopted in the Prophet Mohammed’s lifetime. Especially in the latter half of the 2000s, Sızıntı and Kırık Testi published articles on how the economic system functioned in this period.486 An Islamic economy prevents socioeconomic inequalities and promotes economic development through the system of zekat (alms), rules of fairness in trade, discouraging the use of interest, thereby encouraging investment in productive industries and promoting harmonious relations between employers and employees. The principles of an Islamic economy are very similar to the remedies neoliberal discourse offers to solve economic problems, as we shall see below.
c.2. Relations Between Employers and Employees
In March 2006 Gülen provided a detailed explanation of worker’s rights and relationships between employers and employees. “Rights” is defined as power given to individuals by the legitimate authority to fulfill material and spiritual needs in a religiously sanctioned way.487 In other words, the limits of rights are defined by religion. Gülen indicates indicated that in Islam all people are equal in terms of value and rights. The Prophet advised protecting the rights of the workers, payment of their wages on time and in full, and behaving properly towards them. Gülen’s assertions on the relationship between employers and employees exist in the discourses of other Islamic actors as well, such as the businessmen’s association MÜSĐAD. Gülen further explains that Islam protects child workers. In Islam children are allowed to work to learn arts (artisan/crafts) only if their parents give their consent. He mentions that in Islam any kind of work that is dangerous for a worker’s health is forbidden. Islam prevents the exploitation of workers, and thus “in a way developed the understanding of a classless society.” Here, Gülen’s understanding of “classless society” seems to refer to a society where income differences do exist but exploitation of worker is avoided. Gülen mentions that “worker” and “employee” are concepts developed by the West. The words worker and employee are also used in Islamic society; but they are not intended to denote a social class. What Gülen means is these concepts refer to what individuals do for a living, their job, not their place in social structure. In the social life of Muslims there is no class conflict. Gülen mentions that “in Islam richness and poverty are viewed as tests for the Muslims,” which means that income inequalities are not viewed primarily as the result of the socioeconomic system. Instead they are viewed as natural. Gülen refers to Islam’s understanding of the economic system as a “just order.” In a just order, there is the principle of the ‘brotherhood of religion” (din kardesliği): nobody is always an employer or employee. These roles can change. Islam is in favor of balance and harmony between employers and employees. Therefore, in Islam strikes and lock-outs are discouraged and socioeconomic conflicts should be avoided.488 The erosion of class-based identity in favor of cultural identities promoted since 1980 in Turkey constitutes a significant element in the AKP’s hegemonic discourse discussed in Chapter 3. Thus, the GC discourses support and help legitimate the AKP’s discourse.
d. Social Justice
The GC discourse does not completely exempt the state from providing social services. Gülen mentions that if the individuals cannot find jobs, the state is obliged to find them jobs or create new job opportunities. Safeguarding the livelihood of the sick, old, homeless and poor is also among the state’s duties. In this sense, the state is similar to a “caring father” of the society.489 However, since the early 2000s, Gülen has encouragedthe provision of social justice through the establishment of voluntary social services,social solidarity against poverty, and civil society institutions in keeping with neoliberaldiscourse. In the January 2009 issue of Sızıntı social services provided by pious civilsociety institutions are differentiated from secular civil society institutions.490 Pioussocial services have a spiritual dimension. This means that social services are providedadhering to the model of a “moral person” and in accordance with national moral values.
e. Social Transformation: The Relationship between the Individual and Society
In the late 1990s, the GC’s discourse on the relationship between the individual and the community (in the context of social transformation) was based on the idea of social change through the transformation of the individual, an understanding of identity without contradictions, and the acceptance of individual differences only after basic national identities are consolidated. In the late 2000s, a change in the collective cognition was also viewed as necessary to transform individuals and families. Collective cognition” was defined as a combination of religion, morality, culture and fitrat (human nature by creation). According to Gülen, collective cognition does not mean suppression of differences; rather, it is synonymous with the creation of an environment suitable to the emergence of different abilities and dispositions. In such an environment, people are respectful of each other’s opinions and open to different observations. However, Gülenargued that the form and re-creation (islah and ihya) of the institution of the familydepends on the reform and re-creation of society with religion and tradition, with all itsinstitutions.491 Gülen also expressed his opinion that people should not be permitted toget married until they get a diploma or certificate that says “he/she can get married.” It isnot clear who will give this certificate. Whether he means parents or someone who knowsreligious and customary principles well, or someone who is experienced in marriage,individuals should make certain life choices only with the permission of others.
The boundaries between collective cognition and individual choices are established by controlling women’s place in society, as women’s empowerment is challenging and shifting those boundaries. In the GC, feminism is viewed as one of the major causes of increasing divorce rates, which is an indication of the loss of moral values and the degeneration of Turkish culture. Feminist views lead to competition between men and women and damage the peace in families. “A group of feminists” want to idolize women (worshipping women instead of God). This idolization leads women to struggle with “handicaps” that are not in keeping with their nature. (fıtrat). The handicaps are not explained in this article but in the context of this and other texts on women, one can infer that these “handicaps” are jobs and activities that are viewed as appropriate for men. Gülen criticizes the “serazat” (i.e. free, independent, and comfortable) lives that both men and women lead.492 Thus, challenging men’s position in society and engaging inactivities that are contrary to women’s nature indicate that the boundary of individualfreedom has been crossed and public, which acts with collective cognition, shouldinterfere to protect both society and woman.
The idea that differences are encouraged within collective cognition based on a commonly accepted level of morality helps us understand the meaning of “difference” in the community. Difference is understood in terms of variance in the abilities, capabilities and dispositions within the limits of collective cognition. It does not mean making life choices contrary to the collective cognition, being completely free and independent from the family and community. Behaviors that are considered to be against one’s nature (fıtrat) are not identified as being different, they are identified as acting in contradiction to the collective cognition.
The discourse of “respect for differences” that has been constructed as a part of the neoliberal hegemonic discourse by the intellectuals is articulated by the GC with the reference point of morality. Morality, which is constituted of commonly accepted traditions and religious principles, acts as a lens through which difference is understood. Morality also sets the boundaries of what constitutes difference and what constitutes deviant behavior. This boundary has been much more clearly defined in the late 2000s compared to the early 2000s. The imbuing of everyday life with religious principles and traditions is justified in the community discourse by the need for security and safety. Thisdiscourse in the community serves to legitimate and support the neoliberal hegemonicdiscourse in Turkey discussed on Chapter 3.
f. Liberty, Justice, Democracy and Human Rights
In the latter half of the 2000s, liberty was defined in the GC discourse as the ability to realize unimpeded every wish that is not contrary to the spirit of religion. Liberty does not mean excessive freedom. The boundaries of freedom are determined by morality. True liberty can be realized only by setting aside worldly worries and burdens and orienting oneself towards God. In today’s world, liberty is understood as realizing every wish without any obstacles. This conceptualization of liberty is based on materialism instead of morality. The concept of morality also plays the role of a prism through which the concept of justice is re-constructed. Justice is defined as acting in accordance with creation (fıtrat). Morality acts as a conflict resolution mechanism. Changing the rules set by morality is viewed as anarchy and therefore illegitimate.
In the latter half of the 2000s, the concept of multiculturalism began to be articulated. In multicultural societies, rules should protect the rights of everyone. For the sake of harmony, everyone should be equal under the law, and there should be no discrimination. It is significant that rule of law was mentioned and advocated for the first time in this context. However, in discussions of multiculturalism, the focus was only on the rights ofpious people, and the emphasis was largely on the headscarf issue. How multiculturalismwould apply to other cultures in the society was not discussed. Moreover, Gülen’sportrayal of the relationship between individual and society demonstrates the assumptionthat “our own values,” traditions and religious principles are clearly identifiable andtherefore mutually agreed upon.
As Hall argues, articulation involves connections between earlier discourse patterns and new ideologies, and a change in the relative weight of the earlier discourses. In the late 2000s the GC still made references to security and safety, which are the remnants of the dominant discourse of the early 1980s. However, the Community discourse shifted the meanings of these concepts by connecting them to the need for cultural boundaries in the context of the intensification of economic, social and cultural ties between countries. As a result of this articulation, security and safety have come to be portrayed in economic terms. Support for the state, one of the most distinguishing features of the GC until the late 1990s, also evolved in the late 2000s towards cultural independence and protecting national identities. In sum, the GC discourse of the late 2000s involves elements from its earlier discourses and from earlier hegemonic discourses in Turkey.
In the second half of the 2000s, however, there is much more emphasis on the role of the community vis-à-vis the individual in bringing about social change. The community becomes more important, not only in terms of shaping personality traits, but also in terms of identifying the meaning of democracy, pluralism and human rights. The primarymeans of social change is now viewed as the “collective cognition,” which is composedof religion, morality, culture and human nature. The next section will focus on theconnections between these discursive shifts and changes in the socioeconomic andpolitical structure in Turkey in the process of neoliberal restructuring.
5.8.4. Reference Points And Related Concepts
The figure below shows the significant reference points and the concepts they redefine in the GC discourse in the second half of 2000s. The reference points and associated concepts will be discussed in the next section.
5.8.1. Topics
As the size and number of businesses owned by GC participants increased and they became important actors of the economic system in Turkey, the Community itself became more institutionalized, the reach of its institutions increased and the range of its activities diversified. As a result, especially after 2006, there was a discernible increase in the number and range of issues in the community’s publications. In Sızıntı, Kırık Testi and Bamteli, identity construction through descriptions of self and others continued to be one of the most prominent topics. As more and more women in the GC started to work both in the institutions of the community and in the private sector, women’s role in the public and private spheres became an issue of interest. The need to regulate the relationship between men and women increased. As a result, after 2006, there was a significant increase in the number of articles on marriage and family life, working mothers and their families, and divorce. Compared to the early 2000s, in this period concepts of dialog, human rights, justice and democracy were also much more elaborated upon, and articulated into the community discourse. Articles on economic issues increased in number. As community businesses became more successful, a need emerged to regulate the relations between employer and employee. Community discourse evolved in order to shape these relationships. Many diverse issues on the economy were covered in the publications: how to conduct trade; business ethics; globalization and economic crisis; worker’s rights; and relations between employers and employees in Islam. From time to time these topics have been accompanied by a criticism of a consumption society. In line with neo-liberal discourse, social services and altruism were offered as a remedy for the economic hardships. Explanations of social justice and the principles of an Islamic economic system were provided as a guide for Muslim businessmen.
5.8.2. Nomination
As a result of the diversification of community members’ activities, new categories for construction of the self and other emerged. The other became more defined. Alongside the “West,” publications started to identify the EU and USA as separate actors. Even more specific, US corporations and European youth emerged as actors in community publications. As community members started to interact with an increasing number of actors in various settings, different constructions of self emerged with reference to different others. In the US community, members saw themselves as “representatives of the Turkish nation.”476
Table 5.2. Nomination of Self and Other in the GC Discourse between 2006 and 20
5.8.3. Predication
a. Self and Other
In the latter half of the 2000s, the financial resources of the GC grew significantly, increasing the range and reach of the Community activities. As a result, the Community members started to interact with many different actors, including other Islamic business associations such as MÜSĐAD, as well as with non-Islamic TÜSĐAD, international governmental and non-governmental institutions. In the process, the discourses of the Community regarding relationships between actors in the economic sphere, in families, and in everyday life became more elaborate. As the Community started to interact with more diverse actors, it felt to need to communicate with them, while preserving its own identity. As a result, “dialog and tolerance between cultures,” and “inter-faith dialogue” discourses dominated the Community’s interaction with non-Turkish social actors.
Another significant change in the community discourse has been the construction of a division between the folk Muslimness or “cultural Muslimness” and “conscious Muslimness.” This division served to differentiate community members, who are “conscious Muslims,” from people who practice Islam in accordance with what they have learnt from their environment. The latter group of people learns Islam from cultural practices, while conscious Muslimness is acquired from authorities on Islam such as Said-i Nursi. “Cultural” Muslimness was identified as one of the major threats, and a disaster for the believers.477 Those who view cultural Muslimness as sufficient, see Islam as similar to other cultural traditions. It is imitated. A person cannot meet with/discover true Islam in this way. This discourse involved the assumption that there is only one true Islam, and it should be learnt from a theologian or religious authority. The distinction between cultural and conscious Muslimness has given the community the power of knowledge, which means that the community is constructing itself as an authority on what “conscious Muslim” identity entails.
b. Working Women
Neoliberalization of the economic system and feminization of the workforce alongside it increased women’s presence in the public sphere. Jobs in the informal economy with no job security, low wages, flexible working hours, part time or done from home are disproportionately filled by women.478 In response to changing socioeconomic structure, Sızıntı published articles on changes in gender roles and in relations in both the public and private spheres. These articles mostly focused on working mothers, marriage and family life. Followers of the community asked Gülen many questions abou these changes, and his responses were published in Kırık Testi and Bamteli. In an article on working mothers, he advises women to consider all the adverse effects of working on their children.479 The article does not mention any positive effects. Omission of the other side of the story serves to legitimate staying at home. He argues that women are by nature (italics mine) more sensitive to fatigue and stress. In addition, if the wages are barely enough to cover the costs of commuting, food (consumed at work) and child care expenses, staying home is argued to be more beneficial. Elsewhere Gülen frames daycare for children in terms of their being alone, deprived of parents’ care, and more or less abandoned.480 So, the advice in the journal is that “working only if necessary” should be the principle in deciding to work.
In Bamteli, Gülen mentioned that women can work as long as the workplace is run in accordance with the basic principles of religion. Women and men decide on this together and arrange their daily chores.481 In an article in Sızıntı published three years later, details regarding working women were elaborated. Accordingly, there are certain jobs that can be performed by women. If the mother works in such a job, other family members need to help (italics mine) her with the household chores. Aydınlı argued that in Islam women and men have clearly assigned roles.482 The head of the household is the father. If the mother earns more than the father and is economically independent, she should be respectful to her spouse as the head of the household. Children should see their father as the authority at home. Working should not be understood as gaining power or selfsufficiency. Working means providing the required support for the family. If mothers use working as an advantage this will weaken the bonds in the family.
In the context of GC, women’s “nature” (fıtrat) was used as a reference point or “prism” through which the concept of “working woman” was articulated into the community discourse. A woman who acts according to her fıtrat does not work unless it is a necessity for the family’s well-being. If she works, she works in a job that is appropriate to her fıtrat. She respects gender relations in the household that are determined by fıtrat. The concept of fıtrat provides an adjustment to and acceptance of the gender inequalities exacerbated by the neo-liberal economy. A discourse which adopts the concept of “citizen’s rights” as a reference point/prism in understanding social services would characterize higher wages and childcare services for women as a “right” of the citizen. A discourse that ignores or de-emphasizes the idea that provision welfare services is the right of the citizens and an obligation of the state prevents the criticism of a political system that overrides these rights or views welfare services as a “gift” from the stare to its citizens. Such a discourse also accepts and legitimates the circumstances neoliberalization pushes women into. Readers can infer that it is normal for women to receive lower wages because women are constructed as physically weak and mentally “more sensitive to stress” at work. Taking care of children is the mother’s job; therefore, it is normal that childcare is not provided. By informing women that their children need their mothers in various times of the day, part-time jobs and working from home are encouraged, but again only if such work is absolutely necessary for the family. This discourse not only serves to perpetuate the neoliberal system. It also supports the AKP’s discourse which constructs the institution of family as the main protector of women from injustices, as opposed to “rights” ensured by the state as discussed in Chapter 3.
c. The Economy
c.1. Lack of morality as the cause of economic problems and an “Islamic Economy” as a remedy
Criticism of capitalism in the late 1990s and early 2000s evolved into criticism of more specific aspects of the world economic system by the latter half of the 2000s. The criticism by Gülen was now directed towards the self-interested homo-economicus, the consumption society, the concentration of power in the world economic system and the resulting inequalities between countries. Globalization was constructed as a threatening process.483 The problems caused by economic policies in Turkey were not discussed; rather, economic inequalities were portrayed as resulting from a materialist culture based on self-interest, and inequality between the countries’ economic powers. Turkey’s economic interests were presented as unitary.
The main reason for economic crises and inequalities was viewed as the degeneration of morality. Here, morality is understood as a timeless and universal measure of human behavior. Degeneration of morality results from a loss of cultural values. It is significant that since the mid-1990s, the economic system itself had never been viewed as a cause of the spread of values such as self-interest. When morality degenerates, unsatisfied ambition, self-interest and the blinding effect of one’s bodily appetites takes over individuals. The financial crises seem to be a result of combined decisions of selfinterested individuals who lack moral values.484 In the June 2011 issue of Sızıntı, Yavas argued that “consumption madness”, indulgence in luxury and extravagance lead to economic crises.485
To avoid economic problems such as financial crises and inequality, we need to restore morality. An Islamic economy would ensure moral practices and lead to economic prosperity. An “Islamic economy” refers to the economic system adopted in the Prophet Mohammed’s lifetime. Especially in the latter half of the 2000s, Sızıntı and Kırık Testi published articles on how the economic system functioned in this period.486 An Islamic economy prevents socioeconomic inequalities and promotes economic development through the system of zekat (alms), rules of fairness in trade, discouraging the use of interest, thereby encouraging investment in productive industries and promoting harmonious relations between employers and employees. The principles of an Islamic economy are very similar to the remedies neoliberal discourse offers to solve economic problems, as we shall see below.
c.2. Relations Between Employers and Employees
In March 2006 Gülen provided a detailed explanation of worker’s rights and relationships between employers and employees. “Rights” is defined as power given to individuals by the legitimate authority to fulfill material and spiritual needs in a religiously sanctioned way.487 In other words, the limits of rights are defined by religion. Gülen indicates indicated that in Islam all people are equal in terms of value and rights. The Prophet advised protecting the rights of the workers, payment of their wages on time and in full, and behaving properly towards them. Gülen’s assertions on the relationship between employers and employees exist in the discourses of other Islamic actors as well, such as the businessmen’s association MÜSĐAD. Gülen further explains that Islam protects child workers. In Islam children are allowed to work to learn arts (artisan/crafts) only if their parents give their consent. He mentions that in Islam any kind of work that is dangerous for a worker’s health is forbidden. Islam prevents the exploitation of workers, and thus “in a way developed the understanding of a classless society.” Here, Gülen’s understanding of “classless society” seems to refer to a society where income differences do exist but exploitation of worker is avoided. Gülen mentions that “worker” and “employee” are concepts developed by the West. The words worker and employee are also used in Islamic society; but they are not intended to denote a social class. What Gülen means is these concepts refer to what individuals do for a living, their job, not their place in social structure. In the social life of Muslims there is no class conflict. Gülen mentions that “in Islam richness and poverty are viewed as tests for the Muslims,” which means that income inequalities are not viewed primarily as the result of the socioeconomic system. Instead they are viewed as natural. Gülen refers to Islam’s understanding of the economic system as a “just order.” In a just order, there is the principle of the ‘brotherhood of religion” (din kardesliği): nobody is always an employer or employee. These roles can change. Islam is in favor of balance and harmony between employers and employees. Therefore, in Islam strikes and lock-outs are discouraged and socioeconomic conflicts should be avoided.488 The erosion of class-based identity in favor of cultural identities promoted since 1980 in Turkey constitutes a significant element in the AKP’s hegemonic discourse discussed in Chapter 3. Thus, the GC discourses support and help legitimate the AKP’s discourse.
d. Social Justice
The GC discourse does not completely exempt the state from providing social services. Gülen mentions that if the individuals cannot find jobs, the state is obliged to find them jobs or create new job opportunities. Safeguarding the livelihood of the sick, old, homeless and poor is also among the state’s duties. In this sense, the state is similar to a “caring father” of the society.489 However, since the early 2000s, Gülen has encouragedthe provision of social justice through the establishment of voluntary social services,social solidarity against poverty, and civil society institutions in keeping with neoliberaldiscourse. In the January 2009 issue of Sızıntı social services provided by pious civilsociety institutions are differentiated from secular civil society institutions.490 Pioussocial services have a spiritual dimension. This means that social services are providedadhering to the model of a “moral person” and in accordance with national moral values.
e. Social Transformation: The Relationship between the Individual and Society
In the late 1990s, the GC’s discourse on the relationship between the individual and the community (in the context of social transformation) was based on the idea of social change through the transformation of the individual, an understanding of identity without contradictions, and the acceptance of individual differences only after basic national identities are consolidated. In the late 2000s, a change in the collective cognition was also viewed as necessary to transform individuals and families. Collective cognition” was defined as a combination of religion, morality, culture and fitrat (human nature by creation). According to Gülen, collective cognition does not mean suppression of differences; rather, it is synonymous with the creation of an environment suitable to the emergence of different abilities and dispositions. In such an environment, people are respectful of each other’s opinions and open to different observations. However, Gülenargued that the form and re-creation (islah and ihya) of the institution of the familydepends on the reform and re-creation of society with religion and tradition, with all itsinstitutions.491 Gülen also expressed his opinion that people should not be permitted toget married until they get a diploma or certificate that says “he/she can get married.” It isnot clear who will give this certificate. Whether he means parents or someone who knowsreligious and customary principles well, or someone who is experienced in marriage,individuals should make certain life choices only with the permission of others.
The boundaries between collective cognition and individual choices are established by controlling women’s place in society, as women’s empowerment is challenging and shifting those boundaries. In the GC, feminism is viewed as one of the major causes of increasing divorce rates, which is an indication of the loss of moral values and the degeneration of Turkish culture. Feminist views lead to competition between men and women and damage the peace in families. “A group of feminists” want to idolize women (worshipping women instead of God). This idolization leads women to struggle with “handicaps” that are not in keeping with their nature. (fıtrat). The handicaps are not explained in this article but in the context of this and other texts on women, one can infer that these “handicaps” are jobs and activities that are viewed as appropriate for men. Gülen criticizes the “serazat” (i.e. free, independent, and comfortable) lives that both men and women lead.492 Thus, challenging men’s position in society and engaging inactivities that are contrary to women’s nature indicate that the boundary of individualfreedom has been crossed and public, which acts with collective cognition, shouldinterfere to protect both society and woman.
The idea that differences are encouraged within collective cognition based on a commonly accepted level of morality helps us understand the meaning of “difference” in the community. Difference is understood in terms of variance in the abilities, capabilities and dispositions within the limits of collective cognition. It does not mean making life choices contrary to the collective cognition, being completely free and independent from the family and community. Behaviors that are considered to be against one’s nature (fıtrat) are not identified as being different, they are identified as acting in contradiction to the collective cognition.
The discourse of “respect for differences” that has been constructed as a part of the neoliberal hegemonic discourse by the intellectuals is articulated by the GC with the reference point of morality. Morality, which is constituted of commonly accepted traditions and religious principles, acts as a lens through which difference is understood. Morality also sets the boundaries of what constitutes difference and what constitutes deviant behavior. This boundary has been much more clearly defined in the late 2000s compared to the early 2000s. The imbuing of everyday life with religious principles and traditions is justified in the community discourse by the need for security and safety. Thisdiscourse in the community serves to legitimate and support the neoliberal hegemonicdiscourse in Turkey discussed on Chapter 3.
f. Liberty, Justice, Democracy and Human Rights
In the latter half of the 2000s, liberty was defined in the GC discourse as the ability to realize unimpeded every wish that is not contrary to the spirit of religion. Liberty does not mean excessive freedom. The boundaries of freedom are determined by morality. True liberty can be realized only by setting aside worldly worries and burdens and orienting oneself towards God. In today’s world, liberty is understood as realizing every wish without any obstacles. This conceptualization of liberty is based on materialism instead of morality. The concept of morality also plays the role of a prism through which the concept of justice is re-constructed. Justice is defined as acting in accordance with creation (fıtrat). Morality acts as a conflict resolution mechanism. Changing the rules set by morality is viewed as anarchy and therefore illegitimate.
In the latter half of the 2000s, the concept of multiculturalism began to be articulated. In multicultural societies, rules should protect the rights of everyone. For the sake of harmony, everyone should be equal under the law, and there should be no discrimination. It is significant that rule of law was mentioned and advocated for the first time in this context. However, in discussions of multiculturalism, the focus was only on the rights ofpious people, and the emphasis was largely on the headscarf issue. How multiculturalismwould apply to other cultures in the society was not discussed. Moreover, Gülen’sportrayal of the relationship between individual and society demonstrates the assumptionthat “our own values,” traditions and religious principles are clearly identifiable andtherefore mutually agreed upon.
As Hall argues, articulation involves connections between earlier discourse patterns and new ideologies, and a change in the relative weight of the earlier discourses. In the late 2000s the GC still made references to security and safety, which are the remnants of the dominant discourse of the early 1980s. However, the Community discourse shifted the meanings of these concepts by connecting them to the need for cultural boundaries in the context of the intensification of economic, social and cultural ties between countries. As a result of this articulation, security and safety have come to be portrayed in economic terms. Support for the state, one of the most distinguishing features of the GC until the late 1990s, also evolved in the late 2000s towards cultural independence and protecting national identities. In sum, the GC discourse of the late 2000s involves elements from its earlier discourses and from earlier hegemonic discourses in Turkey.
In the second half of the 2000s, however, there is much more emphasis on the role of the community vis-à-vis the individual in bringing about social change. The community becomes more important, not only in terms of shaping personality traits, but also in terms of identifying the meaning of democracy, pluralism and human rights. The primarymeans of social change is now viewed as the “collective cognition,” which is composedof religion, morality, culture and human nature. The next section will focus on theconnections between these discursive shifts and changes in the socioeconomic andpolitical structure in Turkey in the process of neoliberal restructuring.
5.8.4. Reference Points And Related Concepts
The figure below shows the significant reference points and the concepts they redefine in the GC discourse in the second half of 2000s. The reference points and associated concepts will be discussed in the next section.
Komentar
Posting Komentar